Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application?
- 1 January 2000
- book chapter
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
Abstract
Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing international environmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical, abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on very specific assumptions. This article tries to qualify this critic. First, it lays out the fundamental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarizes important findings which help to explain the difficulties of cooperation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid asymmetric welfare distributions and to enforce an IEA. Chapter 4 discusses policy instruments in global pollution control and chapter 5 summarizes the results on the formation of coalitions. Third, the results of chapters 3, 4 and 5 are critically reviewed. On the one hand, open issues with respect to the theoretical analysis are characterized. On the other hand, practical problems which are not covered by theory are mentioned and evaluated as to their effect to influence policy conclusions. Fourth, the theoretical results and the derived conclusions of chapters 3 to 5 are applied to the analysis of the Kyoto-Protocol (chapter 6). The article stresses the intuition behind all results, though formal proofs of new results are given.This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: