The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care
- 1 January 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 10 (4) , 411-432
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(91)90023-g
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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