On Strategic Community Development
- 1 June 2001
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 109 (3) , 546-569
- https://doi.org/10.1086/321017
Abstract
This paper examines strategic behavior of developers who, through offering different congested public‐good packages and revenue/fiscal schemes, compete for residents who are differentiated by income. There is an endogenous determination of numbers and sizes of communities. Developers have an incentive to strongly differentiate their public‐good offerings. In terms of pricing strategies, developers exhibit sharply contrasting behaviors. In low‐income communities, housing consumption is subsidized once lots are priced. In high‐income communities housing consumption is generally taxedKeywords
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