More on knight and the theory of the firm
- 1 May 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 269-276
- https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090140307
Abstract
This article argues that Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989) misrepresented at least some contemporary theories of the firm when they claimed that these theories were constructed on a rigid general equilibrium basis, and contrasted them unfavorably with Frank Knight's theory of the firm. While nexus of contract theories may partially fit this description, this is not the case with the theorizing represented by the work of Oliver Williamson. Boudreaux and Holcombe are also criticized for failing to see that Knight's theory of the firm is in fact consistent with much contemporary theorizing on the firm.Keywords
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