Strategic Experts and Improvising Regulators: Explaining the IASC's Rise to Global Influence, 1973–2001
- 1 December 2005
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Business and Politics
- Vol. 7 (3) , 1-26
- https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1135
Abstract
This article traces the ascent of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) from an obscure group with little influence in the early 1970s to a pre-eminent position as global accounting standard-setter in 2001. I argue that the rise of the IASC can be explained by several factors, including the IASC's ability to build legitimacy through technical expertise, to embed itself in a network of international organizations, and to benefit from rivalries among developed and developing countries and among European and American regulators. But the most important reason for the IASC's success is that its core values aligned strongly with the interests of the most powerful regulator-the US Securities and Exchange Commission.Keywords
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