Why CSCW applications fail: problems in the adoption of interdependent work tools

Abstract
In this paper, we attempt to extend Grudin’s important analysis of CSCW application failure in two ways. First, we demonstrate that failure may occur even when: 1) there are no asymmetries between those who benefit from an application and those who do extra work, and 2) decision makers do not confuse their own personal benefits with the collective benefit. We argue that failure may also be due to interdependence in the payoffs derived from CSCW applications: Payoffs to one user may depend on the behavior of others. Second, in the process of making our arguments about payoff interdependence, we employ some simple graphical tools that may help CSCW designers and managerial decision makers evaluate applications and improve their chances for success. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first define some basic concepts and assumptions. Next, using the graphical analysis techniques of Schelling [Sche78], we consider a simple example of interdependence involving a congested shared text-processing system. This example helps us examine our more interesting examples: “discretionary databases,” such as automatic meeting schedulingsystems, and “critical mass” technologies, such as electronic mail.

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