MULTIPLE BANKING AS A COMMITMENT NOT TO RESCUE
- 22 December 2004
- book chapter
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Research in Finance
Abstract
We show why investors may prefer not to be a firm’s unique lender, even if they are in a strong bargaining position. Some firms need additional funds after a first investment: providing additional funds is rational after the first investment is sunk, but together the two investments are unprofitable. A unique lender will always provide additional funds and make losses. Two creditors can commit not always to provide funds: inefficient negotiations over debt forgiveness may end with a project’s liquidation, which is harmful ex post, but helpful ex ante, if it keeps entrepreneurs with nonpromising projects from initially requesting funds.Keywords
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