Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines
- 30 June 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 17 (2) , 179-192
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0144-8188(97)00002-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding LitigationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996
- Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud OffendersThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1995
- Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of BehaviorJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- The Effect of Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen"The Journal of Human Resources, 1994
- DO WE PUNISH HIGH INCOME CRIMINALS TOO HEAVILY?Economic Inquiry, 1992
- Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of FinesThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1992
- Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?The RAND Journal of Economics, 1991
- Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?Journal of Political Economy, 1987
- The Optimum Enforcement of LawsJournal of Political Economy, 1970
- Crime and Punishment: An Economic ApproachJournal of Political Economy, 1968