The New Federalism Game: Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy
- 1 January 1987
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 17 (2) , 53-67
- https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037643
Abstract
Federal environmental laws have substantially preempted state powers over pollution control. Many of these laws contain a unique implementation scheme called ”primacy,“ which offers a state the opportunity to become the primary enforcement agent for federal policies. Primacy relieves the federal government from enforcing laws within state boundaries even while it retains ultimate control over the policies involved and sets minimum standards. By and large, states have chosen to accept primacy. Characteristics of the units involved in the implementation process explain much of this success. Deviations from the expected patterns reveal how states can manipulate primacy to their own advantage. It is possible, however, that game playing by the states under primacy could undermine the ultimate goals of national environmental policies.This publication has 0 references indexed in Scilit: