Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard
- 13 July 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier
- Vol. 61 (3) , 311-344
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00065-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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