Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
- 1 June 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 30 (1) , 74-97
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Another Note on the Borel-Cantelli Lemma and the Strong Law, with the Poisson Approximation as a By-productThe Annals of Probability, 1973
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffsPacific Journal of Mathematics, 1956