Commentary on “Penetrating the ‘Black Box’: Financial Incentives for Enhancing the Quality of Physician Services,” by Douglas A. Conrad and Jon B. Christianson
- 1 September 2004
- journal article
- other
- Published by SAGE Publications in Medical Care Research and Review
- Vol. 61 (3_suppl) , 69S-75S
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1077558704267505
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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