Relationism and Possible Worlds1
- 1 June 1984
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 35 (2) , 101-113
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/35.2.101
Abstract
Relationism claims that our physical theory does not commit us to spacetime points. I consider how a relationist might rewrite physical theories without referring to spacetime points, by appealing to possible objects and possible configurations of objects. I argue that a number of difficulties confront this project. I also argue that a relationist need not be Machian in the sense of claiming that objects' spatiotemporal relations determine whether any object is accelerating.Keywords
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