Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Probabilities

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Abstract
Acts are functions from the set of states of the world into the set of consequences. Savage proposed axioms regarding a binary relation on the set of acts which are necessary and sufficient for it to be representable by the functional ʃu(*)dP for some real-valued (utility) function u on the set of consequences and a (probability) measure P on the set of states of the world. The Ellsberg paradox leads us to reject one of Savage's main axioms - the Sure Thing Principle - and develop a more general theory, in which the probability measure need not be additive. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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