Competing Auctions
Preprint
- 7 February 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one's patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin."Keywords
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