Institutional design and legislative conflict: The Russian Supreme Soviet—a well-oiled machine, out of control
- 31 December 1996
- journal article
- Published by University of California Press in Communist and Post-Communist Studies
- Vol. 29 (4) , 413-433
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(96)80024-9
Abstract
This article develops a comparative institutional framework for evaluating the new legislatures of the former Soviet Union, and demonstrates that the conventional wisdom about the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is wrong. It was not a totalitarian, Soviet institution whose omnipotent and malevolent Chair singlehandedly dominated policy outputs and controlled the membership. Rather, the Supreme Soviet's non-partisan, committee-centered design enabled the committees to dominate the legislative process and to virtually exclude conflict, even on such objectively contentious legislative issues as the annual budget. However, the non-partisan design denied the legislature the mechanisms for controlling the Chair on non-legislative, political issues, particularly in relations with the executive branch. On legislative issues, the Supreme Soviet was a well-oiled machine, but on political issues it was out of control, thus leading to the legislature's demise. This article demonstrates the utility of an institutional framework for comparing post-communist legislatures, and the necessity of disaggregating legislative and political issues when evaluating legislative performance.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian RegimesPost-Soviet Affairs, 1994
- Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?American Political Science Review, 1987
- Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision MakingAmerican Political Science Review, 1987