The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 70 (1) , 1-45
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00268
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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