The theory of Information and statistical inference. I

Publisher Website
Google Scholar
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to construct a theory of the amount of information provided by an experiment which does not rely on what Good (1962) has termed the modern Bayesian principle that it is legitimate to use the axioms of probability even when this involves the use of probabilities of hypotheses. In this respect the theory of this paper differs from the Lindley (1956), Mallows (1959) and Good (1960) each of which is written from a Bayesian viewpoint. Lindley (1956) expresses the opinion that Bayesian ideas would seem to be necessary to the development of a theory of the amount of information provided by an experiment and it is of interest therefore to determine how far such a theory may be developed without Bayesian ideas. There is further a need to use such a theory to examine how prior knowledge can be expressed quantitatively, and used in accordance with that theory.

This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit: