Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
- 1 June 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 51 (1) , 1-31
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-o
Abstract
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This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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