Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- review article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Literature
- Vol. 43 (4) , 1025-1048
- https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362069
Abstract
In this essay, I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.Keywords
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