EFFECT OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON INCENTIVES TO ENGAGE IN PRICE FIXING
- 1 October 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Economic Policy
- Vol. 7 (4) , 19-35
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00573.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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