The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 87-113
- https://doi.org/10.1086/380404
Abstract
In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism and not just on contracted hours should be taken into account. In particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. In this paper we examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using time-series data for Sweden spanning a long period (1955-99) with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects of the expected sign. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in total sick leave per person employed and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.Keywords
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