The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 4 (3) , 154-159
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00144.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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