Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information
Preprint
- 1 January 1998
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSKeywords
This publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
- Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auctionPublished by Springer Nature ,2008
- Game Theory and Industrial OrganizationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- Innovation and the Emergence of Market DominanceSSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- Auctionin Entry into TournamentsJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Collusion and Price RigiditySSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete InformationSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player CaseGames and Economic Behavior, 1996
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: TheoryThe Review of Economic Studies, 1986
- A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political InfluenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983
- Aggregate Demand Management in Search EquilibriumJournal of Political Economy, 1982