Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 53 (1) , 3-35
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 96 references indexed in Scilit:
- Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategiesPublished by Elsevier ,2006
- Group Beneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured PopulationJournal of Theoretical Biology, 2002
- Are There Really No Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma?Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2002
- Why People Punish DefectorsJournal of Theoretical Biology, 2001
- Strong Reciprocity and Human SocialityJournal of Theoretical Biology, 2000
- George Price’s contributions to evolutionary geneticsJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1995
- No Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's DilemmaJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1994
- Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma gameJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1989
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groupsJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1988
- The genetical evolution of social behaviour. IJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1964