The Capabilites of Voting Rules in the Absence of Coalitions

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Abstract
This paper discusses the features of a variety of rules that might be used to make group choices. The rules are evaluated under an assumption that coalitions have no impact, as might be true when the number of voters is large and secret ballots are used. The contributions of a number of writers are discussed in a framework that exposes new relationships among a variety of ideas. Some conditions that bear on the merit of a voting rule are as follows: Are all choices to be made between pairs of alternatives, or will some choices have to be made over three or more options? If there are multiple options, are they easily located in a Euclidean space? Is it essential that the voting rule involve relatively little calculation, or can it require extensive use of a computer? Is it necessary to treat all voters equally, or can the votes of some be weighted more heavily than those of others? Is there any readily identifiable basis for determining such weights? Could the voters be trusted to reveal intensities of preferences, to be used as weights, or would they behave erratically or strategically if asked to do so?

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