Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' Activism
Preprint
- 1 January 2006
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Many public pension funds engage in institutional activism. These funds use the power of their pooled ownership of publicly traded stocks to affect changes in tKeywords
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