The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage‐Specific Capital
- 1 January 2007
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 75-94
- https://doi.org/10.1086/508732
Abstract
This article considers how divorce law alters the incentives for couples to invest in their marriage, focusing on the impact of unilateral divorce laws on investments in new marriages. Differences across states be- tween 1970 and 1980 provide useful quasi-experimental variation with which to consider incentives to invest in several types of marriage- specific capital: spouse's education, children, household specialization, and home ownership. I find that adoption of unilateral divorce— regardless of the prevailing property-division laws—reduces invest- ment in all types of marriage-specific capital considered except home ownership. In contrast, results for home ownership depend on the underlying property division laws.Keywords
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