Synergies and Internal Agency Conflicts: The Double-Edged Sword of Mergers
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper investigates the interaction between synergies and internal agency conflicts that emerges endogenously in multi-division firms. We model internal ageKeywords
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