THE THEORY OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT: PART 2
- 1 May 1985
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 75-97
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1985.tb00185.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
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