Contrastive knowledge

1 May 2003

journal article
research article
Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations

Vol. 6 (2) , 74-89
https://doi.org/10.1080/10002003058538741

Abstract

We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.

Keywords

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