Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes
- 1 June 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 51 (1) , 92-110
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90052-l
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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