Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
- 1 June 1999
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 93 (2) , 381-398
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2585402
Abstract
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voters' private information. Using examples, we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts. Increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed, however, may lead to higher levels of abstention. We conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes.Keywords
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