THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR ROOTS IN SCIENCE
- 1 August 1952
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 3 (10) , 124-156
- https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/iii.10.124
Abstract
It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism.Keywords
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