Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test
- 1 January 1981
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 36 (2) , 313-322
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00123787
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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