Evading, auditing and taxing
- 1 October 1990
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 43 (1) , 67-92
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(90)90051-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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