Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction?
- 1 March 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (1) , 176-194
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00011.x
Abstract
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