Doctors, Damages and Deterrence
- 8 June 1978
- journal article
- Published by Massachusetts Medical Society in New England Journal of Medicine
- Vol. 298 (23) , 1282-1289
- https://doi.org/10.1056/nejm197806082982304
Abstract
Damages awarded in a malpractice suit must be viewed not only as compensating the victim but also as deterring health-care providers from negligent behavior. Economic analysis of the malpractice system indicates that awards can send a signal to providers that informs them how much to invest in avoiding mishaps.Keywords
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