OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

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Abstract
We consider an optimal two‐country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once‐and‐for‐all transfer payment.
Funding Information
  • Suomen Kulttuurirahasto
  • Yrjö Jahnssonin Säätiö

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