Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
Preprint
- 1 October 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.Keywords
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