Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games
- 1 August 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 36 (2) , 138-157
- https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0818
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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