Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas
- 30 November 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 279-290
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(85)90036-4
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
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