Law and Power: The Sherman Antitrust Act and Its Enforcement in the Petroleum Industry
- 1 February 1985
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Problems
- Vol. 32 (3) , 264-274
- https://doi.org/10.2307/800686
Abstract
An increasing number of sociologists agree that a society's legal norms tend to reflect its configuration of power. They differ on whether that power is pluralistically distributed among competing interest groups or concentrated in the hands of the corporate elite. This paper analyzes the struggle that led to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, and the attempts at antitrust enforcement in a key ogligopolistic industry-petroleum. Historical data show that passage of the act was indeed a defeat for the corporate elite; but elite interests ultimately prevailed through their domination of the enforcement process. My analysis of big oil's success in protecting its interests shows that private, profitoriented corporations enjoy fundamental structural advantages over both the enforcement bureaucracy and social movements pushing for change.Keywords
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