Abstract
In his two lectures on the vocations, Max Weber developed a ‘deep theory’ of responsibility focusing on: 1) a readiness to evaluate critically and repeatedly the foreseeable consequences of one's actions; 2) a willingness to abandon or change one's course if one has reason to believe such action will result in consequences detrimental to other, more valuable ends or obligations; and 3) an ability to justify one's final course of action to others. I criticize, among other things, Weber's idea that the capacity of religion to inspire political responsibility can be measured in terms of its readiness to endorse the use of physical force. I am also critical of his ethical indeterminism and his belief that life- and value-spheres are impervious to rational mediation. Nevertheless, I conclude that his consequentialist theory of responsibility was a valuable contribution to our understanding of the relationship between values and political power.

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