Law, science, and humanity: The normative foundation of social science in law.
- 1 August 1990
- journal article
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Law and Human Behavior
- Vol. 14 (4) , 315-332
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01068159
Abstract
Opposition by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychology-Law Society to the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court would have been justified on normative grounds by the inconsistency of Bork's views with the values underlying the social science in law (SSL) movement. SSL and the Chicago school of law and economics share realist beliefs about the social and political foundations of judicial behavior and the desirability of systematic empirical study as a means of facilitating the administration of justice, but the normative assumptions of the two schools of thought differ. Whereas the Chicago school, with which Bork is identified, reveres wealth maximization. SSL is intended to promote the values fundamental to the Constitution (e.g., respect for human dignity) and reverence for the law as an institution that reifies our sense of community.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of LawColumbia Law Review, 1987
- TrashingStanford Law Review, 1984
- Critical Legal HistoriesStanford Law Review, 1984
- Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal ThoughtStanford Law Review, 1984
- Roll over BeethovenStanford Law Review, 1984
- Ethical principles of psychologists.American Psychologist, 1981
- Is Wealth a Value?The Journal of Legal Studies, 1980
- The Role of the Judge in Public Law LitigationHarvard Law Review, 1976
- Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional ApproachColumbia Law Review, 1935
- The Path of the LawHarvard Law Review, 1897