Causal focus and estimates of consensus: An examination of the false-consensus effect.

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Abstract
Examined one of the underlying mechanisms—people's causal attributions for their own behavior—of the "false-consensus effect" (the tendency to overestimate the commonness of one's own attitudes and behavior). It was hypothesized that when people view their responses as the result of external influences, they overestimate the commonness of those responses; when they see their behavior as stemming from their own personal characteristics or experiences, they make more unbiased estimates of consensus. Study 1 tested this notion by having 109 undergraduates make hypothetical behavioral choices and then manipulating their explanations for their choices. As predicted, Ss who were led to cite personal reasons for their choices made lower consensus estimates than Ss who either were led to cite situational reasons or were unconstrained in their explanations. This causal-focus manipulation also had significant effects on Ss' trait ratings of the kind of person who would choose each alternative. Study 2, with 20 undergraduates, extended these results by finding a significant correlation between the extent to which people perceive a false consensus for various issues and the extent to which those issues prompt situational explanations for one's responses. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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