To Sell or Not to Sell? Telecommunications Policy in Britain and France
- 1 October 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 12 (4) , 355-376
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00005614
Abstract
Using Kingdon's agenda setting model and broadening it to the entire policy formation process, I offer an explanation of why the British privatised their telecommunications authority but the French did not. Privatisation is brought about by coupling three streams or factors in critical moments in time: available alternatives generated in policy communities, high government borrowing needs, and party politics. The findings illuminate the usefulness of Kingdon's model beyond its original application in the United States, and have implications for broader theoretical debates in comparative policy research.Keywords
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