Abstract
An instance theory of attention and memory (ITAM) is presented that integrates formal theories of attention and memory phenomena by exploiting commonalities in their formal structure. The core idea in each theory is that performance depends on a choice process that can be modeled as a race between competing alternatives. Attention and categorization are viewed as different perspectives on the same race. Attention selects objects by categorizing them; objects are categorized by attending to them. ITAM incorporates each of its ancestors as a special case, so it inherits their successes. Imagine yourself on your way home from work. You walk into the parking lot and look for your car. It takes you a second, perhaps. Now imagine your colleagues analyzing the simple act of cognition underlying that look. A student of attention would be interested in how your gaze went to the cars rather than other structural features. A student of categorization would be interested in how you knew those were cars in the parking lot. And a student of memory would be interested in how you did (or did not) pick your own car out of the group. These differences in perspective reflect the divide-and-conquer approach to understanding cogni- tion that has been prevalent among researchers for the last 20 or 30 years. Different researchers focus on the details of different parts of cognition, hoping that their work will interface with the rest. Attention may begin with perception and end when a target is found. Categorization may begin when a target is found and end with a concept. Memory may begin with a concept and end with a recollection or a feeling of familiarity. This article takes a different approach, trying to integrate theo- ries developed under the divide-and-conquer strategy. It views the simple act of cognition as a single phenomenon and interprets attention, categorization, and memory as different perspectives on the same simple act. To attend is to categorize; to categorize is to remember; to remember is to attend. This idea is expressed in a formal theory that combines existing theories of attention, catego- rization, and memory that have similar formal structures. I show how the theory derives from its ancestors and I show how the ancestors can be viewed as special cases of the theory.

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