Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- 1 March 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 35 (2) , 105-120
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00036-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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