Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard
- 1 April 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 103 (2) , 282-310
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2874
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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